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Today, ten years after President Reagan ended oil price and allocation controls and set the
stage for extensive deregulatory changes in the natural gas and electric power industries, a review
of our current domestic and international energy situation may yield some important insights
about what we can expect regarding our future energy security.
Important and sweeping changes have taken place in both energy markets and the energy
industries over the past decade that require fresh, new perspectives on our nation's energy
emergency preparedness if we are to be capable of dealing with the emerging domestic and
international energy problems of the 1990s. We need to look back at what we did right in order
to improve our energy emergency strategy for the future. The energy emergency preparedness
activities of the past decade were the result of the Reagan Administration's energy security
strategy. This strategy and its supporting implementation relied then, and President Bush's
current strategy essentially continues to rely on the free market; on a strengthening of the
domestic energy industry; on cooperative international energy agreements; and on the construc
tion of an energy emergency response framework centered on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
This strategy has proved effective for dealing with past energy emergencies. However,
today the central question for government, industry, and the American public in 1990 is: Will
the existing energy preparedness strategy and its response programs be adequate to deal with the
rapidly emerging problems of the next decade?

The Forces of Change and Market Dynamics
Henson Moore, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, recently told a group of senior state energy
officials from around the country that "We see tremendous problems ahead for energy. Domestic
oil production declined 500 barrels per day in 1989, and forecasts indicate it will be down another
350 in 1990. This means more imported oil, more tankers and more risk of oil spills."
As the present level of United States dependency on imported oil continues to rise, both
consumers and producers are anxiously studying what the eventual outcome will be through the
1990s. Moore also warned of future electric power shortages, noting that "the United States will
need more than 110 gigawatts of new power by the year 2000, but one-third of those are not even
on the drawing board. If we do nothing, we will be far short of new needed capacity." Obtaining
a perspective on our emerging energy problems requires an understanding of market dynamics,
international cooperative response measures, and the government's energy preparedness pro
grams. The following are the key areas affecting market dynamics:
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The Free Market. Past experience with energy supply disruptions has shown that government
regulation of energy markets is a liability rather than an asset. Markets operate best when they
are free of intrusive government regulation in emergencies as well as during normal periods. The
Bush Administration has made sure that they preserved the cornerstone of United States energy
emergency response planning: reliance on the free market-supported by appropriate govern
ment response mechanisms to ensure adequate energy supplies.
Due to its reliance on a flexible, decentralized response, a market strategy is more capable
of dealing with the uncertainties and irregularities posed by an energy emergency. For example,
when considering the uncertainty of an energy emergency, the length and severity of a disruption
is usually not known at the outset, and the impact of a disruption may not be uniform across
economic sectors and geographic regions. The free market strategy can accommodate these
uncertainties by allowing energy consumers to make autonomous decisions based on individual
situations. Few economists would disagree with the fact that market mechanisms have
demonstrated an effective response in every instance of an energy disruption that has been
encountered since the end of price and allocation controls ten years ago.
OPEC: "The Cartel Rejuvenates," As the United States and other countries import more oil
through the 1990s, OPEC's production and market share will rise. About three-fourths of the
world's currently known oil reserves (800 billion barrels) are in OPEC countries. Not only are
most of the world's proven oil reserves in OPEC, but nearly all of the world's excess production
capacity is also concentrated there, mainly in the Persian Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait and the UAE. This dependence will extend into the longer term and become even more
critical as the opportunities to find additional large deposits of oil decrease, and the reserves of
the rest of the world are rapidly depleted.
Approximately 40 percent of the entire free world's oil now comes from OPEC, of which
25 percent comes from the Persian Gulf members. By 1995, barring major changes in supply
sources, around 65 percent of the free world's oil imports are likely to come from OPEC with
35 percent from the Persian Gulf. Overall, the outlook is for a United States that will be more
dependent on the Persian Gulf and potentially more vulnerable to world oil supply disruptions.
Because of its vast oil reserves, the Persian Gulf region will continue to be strategically
important to the United States Conversely, as its largest market, the United States is also
strategically critical to the Gulf OPEC states. The huge economic investments by OPEC
countries in Gulf business and infrastructure have fostered an insatiable and continuing need for
revenues. These funds are needed to fuel continued economic growth as well as to finance
expansion of their petroleum operations to meet future supply needs. This need for revenue has
contributed to a mixed posture within OPEC with disputes about quotas and upward pressure on
oil prices by some members, and a desire for market stability from others.
OPEC members have invested heavily in "downstream" operations with the development
of petrochemical facilities that can use their own crude oil for feedstock and their marketing of
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refined product through commercial outlets in major consumer regions such as the United States,
Europe and Asia.
The Diversification of United States Oil Supply and the NON-OPEC Producers. In response
to the high prices that OPEC was charging in the early 1980s, NON-OPEC countries quickly
moved to take advantage of this situation and develop new sources of oil production. These
NON-OPEC producers from the North Sea, Mexico, Egypt, Oman, Angola, Cameroon, Brazil,
Colombia, China, India, and Malaysia temporarily gained important market share and influence.
At the same time, there was a dramatic shift in the sources of oil imports by the United States,
and the majority of its purchases of imported oil was diversified to NON-OPEC countries.
In 1986, however, this trend began to reverse with OPEC price cuts and declining NON
OPEC production eventually helping OPEC to gradually return to the same level ofUnited States
market dominance that it had in 1979. It is expected that the declining influence of NON-OPEC
oil supplies in the world market will continue into the 1990s, thus contributing to the reemerging
prominence of OPEC.
Demand Growth. The gains brought about in reducing oil demand and consumption in the United
States in the early 1980s as a result of the embargo and higher prices were eventually lost in the
mid-1980s as oil prices fell. These low oil prices may have put an additional $40 billion into the
United States economy, but the resultant economic growth also stimulated an increase in United
States consumption ofpetroleum which accelerated the demand for cheap imported oil. The low
prices also encouraged the large industrial customers with fuel switching capability to use oil
instead of other energy sources. Two of the most serious long term consequences for energy
security brought about by low oil prices was the discouragement of investment in energy
efficiency and the decline of domestic oil exploration and production.
Dependency and Vulnerability. As the United States presently moves toward importing 50
percent or more of its petroleum requirements, the question of our vulnerability must be
considered and understood. For example, vulnerability is a a function of risk to the source of
supply, the economic relationship involved, routes of transportation and supply to the consumer,
and the operation, safety, and the security of the system's infrastructure. As we begin to import
ever increasing amounts of oil from the Persian Gulf, the strategic relationship of the United
States with this region and our dependence on its oil resources will take on a central importance
in our Middle East foreign policy.
The Environment as a Major Factor. One of the largest changes in market dynamics over the past
few years has been the addition of environmental considerations to the traditional focus on price
and security of supply. Environmental issues have come to dominate the national debate over
energy policy. The environmental problems have raised important questions concerning the
extent to which environmental consideration should affect energy development, such as defining
the specifics of the problem, obtaining consensus on what to do about it, understanding how
much it will cost, and who will pay the cost? Specific environmental issues include the global
warming effect, clean air (acid rain, auto emissions, and the smokestack industries), siting of
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powerplants and refineries, electro-magnetic radiation, protecting public lands, clean water,
toxic wastes, etc.
The emerging consensus in public opinion about the need for action to resolve environ
mental problems will be a driving force in shaping the energy planning landscape in the 1990s.
Cambridge Energy Research Associates recently conducted a nationwide public opinion survey
on environmental issues which has some significant findings. One of the most significant for
energy emergency preparedness was that public concerns about our dependence on foreign oil
still register very strongly. In fact, energy dependence is one of the few issues that has the
potential to challenge the environmental consensus. The survey points out that Americans
register deep concerns over rising imports, and favor various steps to bolster United States
production--even at the expense of environmental concerns. At the bottom line most of the
public opposes restrictions on off-shore drilling "ifitmeans importing more foreign oil." In fact,
a majority (64 percent) of Americans would even be willing to accept a refinery in their
community if it reduces dependence on foreign oil.
One ofthe most startling responses was that some of the environmental issues with the most
sweeping implications for energy security policy-global warming, acid rain, and nuclear
waste--00 not rank high among the national priorities that the public is willing to spend huge
amounts of money to resolve. According to the survey, the highest priority environmental issues
on the public's agenda include protecting wilderness lands, cleaning up water pollution and
disposing of toxic wastes and chemicals.
Electric Power. Cheap, abundant electric power has been a significant factor in the recent
unprecedented record period of United States economic growth. However, during December
1989, sub-freezing temperatures increased electricity demand so fast and so high in the South
that cities such as Houston and Tampa had to institute rolling blackouts to keep the entire system
from crashing. John Easton, the DOE official in charge of energy emergencies, stated that what
happened regarding electricity supply in December 1989, "may be a barometer for some parts
of the country. We have been seeing for some time that there are some areas of the country, such
as Florida where we feel the reserve margins are not adequate for the 1990s. We think we will
see more of this type of situation happening."
The electric generating industry has been warning the country that unless present barriers
to construction of sufficient capacity are lifted, there will not be enough electricity to support
economic growth over the next decade. For example, coal is responsible for producing 57
percent ofour nation's electricity, but pending environmental legislation could curtail its use and
increase its cost. The hydro electric industry which provides 9 percent of our nation's electric
ity, is having a difficult time maintaining its situation, much less expanding. Nuclear power
already supplies 29 percent of our electric power, but no more nuclear power plants are planned
in the United States. Thomas Kuhn, Executive Director of the Edison Electric Institute, an
association of investor-owned utilities, says present plans "are not sufficient to meet our needs
over the next decade." According to the North American Electric Reliability Council, some
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parts of the country, such as New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the Pacific Northwest
could have severe power shortages as soon as 1993.
One initial operating response to this problem by industry is to reduce voltage. In past
instances, power delivered to customers was cut by 5 percent, causing minor inconveniences
for residential users but major headaches for businesses depending on steady secure sources of
electricity for sophisticated equipment. In Massachusetts alone, the Boston Chamber of
Commerce estimated that power brownouts in 1988 cost businesses $87 million in lost
productivity. In this regard, John Easton points out an emerging trend when he states, "Too often
businesses don't think much about energy and therefore don't get involved to do much about it.
Business people should also be active in their trade associations to make their voices heard
whenever there is legislation or rule-making at any level of government that might have an
adverse impact on energy."

International Cooperative Efforts
The Interdependence of World Oil Markets, One of the important lessons learned over the past
ten years was that world energy markets-especially international oil markets-are extremely
interdependent. Individual nations cannot "go it alone." They are inevitably affected by the
decisions, linkage, and reactions of all other market participants, both in normal and in
emergency situations. Oil is fungible. This means that a barrel of oil that is produced or saved
anywhere in the world can contribute to world energy security. Similarly, a loss, or even a
shortage of supply anywhere, can affect markets everywhere.
Fortunately, some of the world's major suppliers presently have interests that coincide with
those of the United States. It is in our national security interest to reinforce those common
objectives and to enhance the overall security and welfare of these oil producing countries,
especially if they are in unstable areas of the world.
The International Ener~y A~ency. · Recognizing the interdependence as well as the independ
ence of other nations, the United States seeks a stable and secure energy environment in which
free markets and free people can determine price and production levels.
The United States participates actively in the International Energy Agency of the Organi
zation ofEconomic Cooperation and Development. The IEA is·the principal international forum
for the industrialized countries' cooperation on energy security. The IEA has proved its useful
ness as a vehicle for sharing information and for coordinating policies in regard to oil stocks, free
trade in energy, limiting dependence on Soviet gas, and joint cooperation on R&D for emerging
energy technologies.
The United States Department of Energy works closely with the IEA' s critically important
Standing Committee on Emergency Questions (SEQ). The SEQ is responsible for the IEA's
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emergency preparedness activities, including the emergency sharing and strategic reserve
systems.
NATO. While the future of NATO is a present issue of concern, the United States Department
of Energy has been, and still is, heavily involved in planning for allied oil security. NATO's
approach to emergency oil sharing by civilian authorities has been to maintain a standby
organization called the NATO Wartime Oil Organization (NWOO) that the military could
approach for assistance in obtaining oil supplies.
The spectrum of contingencies NWOO is designed to meet range from pre-war periods of
crisis to post-war reconstruction. Although an oil supply disruption would not by itself warrant
the implementation ofNWOO plans beyond routine monitoring, NATO could choose to activate
parts of NWOO during a crisis short of war if the defense petroleum needs of member countries
were either threatened or not being met. NWOO has considerable operational flexibility since
its activation can be triggered by political, military, or oil shortage considerations.
International Tests and Exercises. The best training instruments for an effective international
energy strategy are tests and exercises. Various exercises are conducted to test both the IEA and
each NATO member's response to international oil supply disruptions. In the IEA for example,
an Allocation Stock Test (AST) is conducted every two years to test the Emergency Sharing
System among the 21 member countries. In 1989, the sixth of these international oil disruption
tests, AST-6, was held, and it had significant participation by State energy offices. Earlier, DOE
completed an initial test ofthe IEA' s Coordinated Emergency Response Measures Test (CERM).
This oil supply exercise was conducted to train personnel in a new IEA procedure that deals with
disruptions that are less than those requiring implementation of the cumbersome IEA Emergency
Sharing System.
IEA tests involve exercising stock draw procedures, either alone or in combination with
demand restraint measures. One of the United States' major exercise response actions has been
to test the drawdowns ofthe Strategic Petroleum Reserve which now has over 580 million barrels
of crude oil in reserve with the present goal to reach 7 50 million barrels stored.

Domestic and International Threats to Energy Security
Developing an effective energy emergency preparedness program demands an understand
ing of domestic and international energy threats that could affect the United States-the nature
of the threats, how they develop, their dynamics, their various categories, and what we can do
about them.
Severe energy crises are not new phenomena. The United States oil industry has experience
sharp peaks and valleys in the price ofoil since oil was first discovered in this country in the mid
nineteenth century. In the 1960s, we had a major electricity failure in New York City; and in the
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1970s, in addition to two "oil crises" in 1973 and 1979, we had a severe natural gas supply
shortage, a crippling coal strike and extensive sabotage to our electric power systems. Just last
year, 1989 was a watershed year for the sheer amount of energy-related accidents and problems,
such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, petroleum industry accidents, hurricanes, earthquakes and
severe winter cold temperatures over much of the country.
The Spectrum of Threats to our Domestic Ener~ Security. Past experience has shown that
natural and manmade events can disrupt our energy supply system. Some emergencies, such as
equipment failures or acts of vandalism, are routinely handled by industry while large regional
problems (e.g., the destruction caused by earthquakes, hurricanes, or tornadoes) may require
immediate action by a state government along with industry. If the situation is beyond the local
response capacity, Federal emergency assistance may be required in addition to the existing state
and energy industry's response.
Natural Disasters. Natural disasters and their potential impacts on our energy infrastructure
present a critical problem for emergency planners throughout the nation. During 1989 a record
34 major natural disasters occurred in the United States--hurricanes, earthquakes, floods,
tornadoes, hailstorms and the like-causing almost $25 billion in damage, killing more than 200
people and injuring at least 4,500.
Most of the general public is not aware that earthquakes are a threat to much of the country,
not only California. Severe earthquakes have taken place in Charleston, South Carolina, and the
New Madrid Fault is a potential problem to a number of southeast states. Floods occur in the
United States about every three days. Tornadoes strike anywhere; in 1989, there were 790 of
them. Today's top hurricane prediction experts think we are in for a 20 year period of more
intense hurricanes such as Hugo and Gilbert, and that the occurrence of these more dangerous
hurricanes will create more damage to beachfront populations and the heavily developed
hurricane-prone coastlines.
These natural disasters and the emergencies they create can cause serious disruptions ofour
energy infrastructure. This can adversely affect the three major industrial components of our
national economic strength and well being-communications, transportation, and water. For
example, electric power is vital to the entire communications industry, including radio,
television, telephones, computers, banking, information management systems, air control
systems, automated control of petroleum pipelines, electric transmission lines, and water trans
portation systems.
Our transportation system relies on the energy infrastructure for the fuel and electricity to
energize the motors that provide the mobility to our cars, trucks, buses, trains, ships, and aircraft.
Without energy we will have great difficulty pumping the gasoline and diesel fuels into vehicles
from our service stations and bulk fuel terminals.
Water also shares an interactive relationship with the nation's energy infrastructure. Water
provides 9 percent of our national energy needs through hydroelectric power. Electricity is
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required to pump and distribute water for residential use, sewage treatment, agriculture,
industrial processes, and for cooling electric power generating plants.
The following is a review of the energy impacts of the major natural disasters of 1989 and
the lessons learned from them:
Hurricane Hu~o. Hurricane Hugo ranks as one of the most destructive storms in United States
history. On September 17, 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; and then
on September 21, it arrived at the South Carolina coast with winds of 138 miles per hour. The
storm blew inland with unexpected force, causing extensive damage not only to the lowcountry
of South Carolina, but also to the Piedmont and Charlotte, North Carolina regions. Early
estimates of mainland economic losses exceeded $8 billion, and when the total costs are tallied,
it will probably be well over $10 billion.
The electric power infrastructure was especially hard hit. In an extraordinary display of
technical competence and operational response, the electric utility companies restored a majority
of customers to service within ten days. These electric power utilities and cooperatives
demonstrated the "can do" spirit of their industry-a trait which this country needs more of.
In addition to Hugo, on October 15, 1989, a hurricane oflesserproportions hit the Galveston,
Texas area, and a late summer snowstorm hit six states in the Midwest that same week, causing
massive power outages.
Hurricane Hugo taught us valuable lessons in energy emergency preparedness, many of
which have implications for those involved in the broader area of emergency preparedness
planning. The main lesson learned from Hurricane Hugo is that it is possible for government and
industry to work together efficiently and effectively in mitigating the effects of such a massive
natural disaster. Indeed, those involved in planning for the recovery from this hurricane can take
pride in their performance in responding to the widespread devastation caused by this storm.
The larger perspective requires us to continue efforts to review this experience and the
lessons learned from it in an effort to improve formalized working relationships between and
among affected agencies from the Federal, state and local governments. We also need to improve
coordination and planning with the energy industry for and coping with disasters of this type and
magnitude. In brief, we need an integrated strategy and a new perspective on energy emergency
preparedness.
The Loma Prieta EarthQ.Jiake. On October 17, 1989, an earthquake registering 7 .1 on the Richter
scale occurred in the San Francisco Bay Area. The earthquake disrupted electric and natural gas
service to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) customers for several days, as a result of damage to
electrical generation, transmission and distribution systems.
Following the earthquake, natural gas leaks from ruptured pipelines posed safety hazards,
necessitating house-by-house inspections by utility personnel. Closure of petroleum pipelines
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products to the impacted areas of San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Monterey, the South Bay and the
East Bay. Fortunately, with this modest level earthquake, there was little or no damage to Bay
Area refineries.
In a more severe earthquake, such as in the planning scenarios for a 7 .5 magnitude quake
along the Hayward fault, widespread power outages and fires caused by natural gas leaks,
chemical spills, and petroleum project pipeline ruptures would have been commonplace.
Loma Prieta taught us that an earthquake requires coordination of energy emergency
planning and response training of federal, state, and industry officials. Coordination at the state
level, and with the state's utilities and fuel suppliers was effective, largely due to training,
advanced planning, and the cooperation ofprivate industry. The electric and natural gas utilities
demonstrated that they have the technical knowledge and operational response capability to deal
with massive energy recovery operations.
The December Freeze.
During the record breaking cold spell of December 1989, severe
shortages of heating oil, natural gas and propane were compounded by a series of events
connected to weather: temporary shutdowns of major Gulf Coast refinery units and offshore gas
platforms (at least 13 refineries and hundreds of gas platforms). This reduced the Nation's overall
refinery runs by 10 percent and our Gulf Coast gas production by a third. Amidst the high
consumer demand brought on by the cold weather, the ice-choked rivers and ports limited oil
delivery barge availability and schedules. In Louisiana, frozen canals and waterways hindered
the attempts ofrepair crews to get their boats to the offshore facilities and placed heavy demands
on the use of helicopters. To make matters worse, low water on the Mississippi River forced a
reduction in oil barge traffic, putting additional pressure on pipeline deliveries.
Additional energy problems unrelated to the cold weather contributed to the array of
cascading events adversely affecting our energy supply. There was an unprecedented rash of
accidents affecting our energy supplies, both here and abroad. Some of the problems in the
United States included:
• The December 24, 1989, explosion and fire at Exxon's Baton Rouge refinery, the second
largest in the United States.
• Fires and explosions at several smallerrefineries around the country, such as at an Amoco
facility at Casper, Wyoming, and a fire that closed down a 10,000 to 20,000 barrel per day
crude oil processing plant at Sweeny, Texas.
• A break in the Colonial Pipeline north of Fredricksburg, Virginia spilled 132,000 gallons
of jet fuel into the local water supply and temporarily shut down the pipeline.
• Several leaks of hundreds of thousands of gallons of crude oil at Exxon's Arthur Kill
facility in New York Harbor caused a temporary halt to tanker and oil barge traffic.
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• A runaway barge spilled 10,000 gallons of gasoline into the Monangahela River. The
barge was among 55 that were ripped from their moorings by chunks of ice that sunk 30
of the barges.
Internationally, there was a series of unusual energy events which contributed to the overall
tightening of supply: simultaneous closure of both the Panama Canal from the United States
invasion and the Suez Canal from a sunken ship; oil worker unrest in Brazil and Algeria; and the
shutdown of a major North Sea oil platform because of underwater leaks.
The coincidental problems exacerbated the stress on the energy system caused by the intense
cold. With the nation's refineries, pipelines, barges and electric utilities-all operating at
maximum sustainable capacity-there was little flexibility or spare capacity to absorb the
disruptions caused by the breakdowns and accidents.
The explosion and gas fire at Consolidated Edison Company's Hellgate Station along the
East River on December 30 in New York City was a prime example of this. Caused by a con
struction worker accidentally digging into a gas line, the result was one death, seven injured,
several hundred thousand customers without power, trains and traffic stopped, and a tremendous
dislocation of people and businesses. The energy emergency problems of December, 1989
underline the overall complexity and vulnerability of our energy supply to unpredictable events.
They also give some indication of the "X-Factors" that we can expect to affect our energy
situation in the future. Defined by energy contingency planners as a pattern of unpredictable
energy events, the "X-Factor" is attributed to aging equipment, a tighter supply-demand balance,
and the increasing frequency of unplanned incidents. The use of the "X-Factor" in contingency
planning is an indicator of our energy infrastructure's diminished tolerance for even minor
disruptions.
There were three important lessons learned during the extreme cold of December 1989.
First, the free market, combined with industry's operational response, demonstrated that
adequate energy supplies can be provided during a limited disruption. Second, cold weather
operational procedures and equipment that are routinely used in northern climates to maintain oil
and gas systems must be kept in a state of readiness, where appropriate, for the production,
transportation and storage of oil and gas in subfreezing weather in southern states. Third, the
electric power industry's generating capacity can be vulnerable to unusually high peak demands
in winter, as well as summer.
Terrorism and Sabota~e. Although only 35 sabotage and terrorism attacks were directed against
United States energy systems last year, over a thousand attacks take place every year around the
world. Those foreign terrorists are "only a plane ride away!"
An international framework for terrorist action exists throughout the world. The objectives
and criminal acts of worldwide terrorist organizations pose a potential treat to our national
security as well as our energy security. Our nation's vulnerability to attacks has been
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security as well as our energy security. Our nation's vulnerability to attacks has been
demonstrated, yet we have domestic "home-grown" terrorists who, while fairly active, have not
as yet operated against energy targets on a scale that could adversely affect national security.
Nevertheless, a review of the overall energy terrorism situation indicates that sabotage must be
seriously considered as a potential cause of an energy emergency in the United States.
World-wide terrorism is rising about 10 to 15 percent per year. In the United States,
multisite sabotage and terrorist incidents represent potential threats, but the number of sabotage
incidents involving our electric power systems has not reached a level of severity to cause a major
sustained outage. Today, the two most troublesome domestic terrorist organizations for the
energy sector are the radical environmentalists and the Puerto Rican separatists. In May 1989
the FBI arrested several members of the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy
who were planning an attack on a DOE nuclear facility. This group was also responsible for
recent attacks against electric power systems in the western region of the United States. In
addition, Puerto Rican pro-independence movement groups such as the Macheteros have
targeted electric power systems in the past and were responsible for eight separate attacks in June
July, 1989. Today the FBI considers the Puerto Rican terrorists to be our most significant
domestic terrorist threat.
Many third world countries, such as El Salvador, Peru, Chile, Columbia, Mozambique,
Afghanistan, and Guatemala, have experienced substantial power and petroleum system disrup
tions because of terrorism. Terrorist organizations have also attacked electric power and oil
facilities in Western Europe. In the past, these attacks generally were poorly designed and
executed, but today recent attacks by the same organizations are executed using a higher level
of technology and are much better planned. This may portend more effective attacks against
European energy systems in the future, and an increasing potential threat for the United States.
Energy-related terrorism can be a particularly significant threat in a time of national defense
mobilization. However, even in the absence of a superpower confrontation, it is possible that
potential third-world adversaries could sponsor attacks on the energy infrastructure in the United
States. Hence, it is important for the Federal and state governments to work closely with industry
to mitigate these potential threats.
Ener~y Indusny Related Accidents. In addition to the problems associated with the December
freeze, the following is a brief review of some of the more significant accidents that took place
in 1988-89 to our energy infrastructure:
• The Exxon Valdez oil spill of 250,000 barrels of crude oil into Prince William Sound,
Alaska.
• The main pipeline carrying gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Los Angeles refineries to
Las Vegas exploded in San Bernadino, California, injuring a number ofpeople destroying
a nearby neighborhood.
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• An explosion and fire in the 90,000 barrel per day fluid catalytic cracking unit at Shell
Oil Company's Norco, Louisiana facility killed seven employees, destroyed major plant
components, caused widespread damage to the community, and caused a shortage of
refined product as industry was preparing for the summer driving season.
• A cloud of hydrofluoric acid was released at Marathon Petroleum Company's 69,500
barrel per day Texas City refinery when a crane dropped its load on the HF tank, forcing
evacuation of about 3,000 persons from nearby residential areas.
• About 750,000 gallons of Number 2 fuel oil spilled into the Monongahela River when an
Ashland Oil Incorporated storage tank collapsed at Floreffe, Pennsylvania.
• A Panamanian vessel carrying soda ash ran aground after colliding with the Chevron
Louisiana tanker carrying 262,000 barrels ofan asphalt/diesel mix on the Columbia River
in Washington State, but fortunately neither lost its cargo.
• A fire and series of explosions at a New Cassel, Long Island, propane plant forced the
evacuation of 10,000 people, killed one plant worker, and injured another.
• A large fishing boat struck a natural gas underwater pipeline off Texas' Sabine Pass in
the Gulf of Mexico causing an explosion and a large fireball visible 25 miles away,
resulting in 11 crewmen's death.
• Fires and explosions at the Phillips Petrochemical plant near Houston resulted in
extensive damage and loss oflife. This was the largest domestic industrial accident since
World War II.
This list is not meant to cast any aspersions on the energy industry's safety programs. They
have moved safety and environmental protection to the forefront of their operations with the
adoption offormal risk assessment and safety management programs that go far beyond their past
efforts. The fundamental lesson that should be understood is that parts of our energy infrastruc
ture have basically dangerous processes, and that accidents will happen when conducting
operations of this kind. Industry's objective is to reduce the potential risk of these type of
accidents, and if they occur, to limit the damage as much as possible.
International Threats to Ener~y Security. A major threat to our energy security is the disruption
of our oil supply that could be caused by political events such as the closing of the Straits of
Hormuz. With the exception of the limited amounts of natural gas and electricity that the United
States obtains from Canada, the major international energy concern must focus on oil. Oil price
shocks and supply security pose the dominant threat to international energy security. As oil is
a vital resource for fueling the United States and our industrial trading partner's economies, oil
prices and supplies have important implications for international trade. The lower oil prices have
brought immediate economic benefits to sections ofthe United States economy, but the downside
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is that they also have contributed to a higher level of imports with increasing vulnerability to
disruptions.
World oil supplies have been interrupted about 15 times since 1950, all of which occurred
because ofpolitical events in the Middle East. Although the risk of a significant disruption may
appear remote, many of the political, social, cultural and military factors that led to past
disruptions in the Persian Gulf continue to exist. For example, the Iran-Iraq confrontation is still
unresolved. There is a strong spirit oflslamic revivalism. Aging leadership throughout the Gulf
presents problems of succession. Divisions still remain among the Gulf states. More and more
destructive weapons are being stockpiled including chemical weapons, missiles, rockets, and, in
some cases, nuclear weapons.
History has shown that relatively small changes in world oil supply and demand can produce
dramatic swings in oil prices. Market turbulence can be caused by stress on the supply system,
market expectations, inventory movements, the circumstances of the disruption, and the
responses of both producing and consuming countries. Another important factor in international
oil demand is the rapidly-growing requirements of lesser developed countries that put, upward
pressure on worldwide demand for the global supply of oil. In addition, as United States
production decreases, we will become increasingly dependent on imports from OPEC, particu
larly from the politically volatile Persian Gulf.

Summary
The United States energy infrastructure has little flexibility to absorb severe price and supply
dislocations that can arise from international disruptions, natural disasters, accidents, and
extreme weather. The situation does not appear to be improving as we move into the 1990s. This
situation demands that contingency planning, a national energy strategy such as being developed
by DOE, and the responses for energy emergencies among Federal, state, and industry organi
zations, all need to be coordinated and integrated. This should involve government-industry
cooperation, stringent readiness tests and exercises, and the application of adequate resources.
Risk of future oil supply disruptions will vary with market conditions. At present, there are
adequate world oil supplies, making a severe disruption unlikely over the short term, but the
United States can expect to experience local shortages from incidents, such as with the Exxon
Valdez's Alaskan oil spill and December 1989s extreme cold. This necessitates a flexible energy
policy, on-going market monitoring, and expert situation analysis. Responses to international
threats of an oil disruption should include the buildup of strategic stocks, coordinated plans for
early drawdowns of stocks, alternative delivery routes, and fuel switching capabilities.
Domestic energy security requires an understanding of the complex energy infrastructure
that underpins the United States economy, its security, and our basic societal energy needs. This
understanding can lead to sound energy emergency preparedness programs. These programs
should be supported by a full range of Federal, state and industry crisis response organizations
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that have adequate resources to perform the necessary planning, training and operations to
prevent or mitigate future energy disruptions.
Energy emergency preparedness must be integrated into the national emergency planning
processes. Too often crisis management teams are not adequately prepared to deal with the
technical, legal, and regulatory aspects of an energy emergency. Yet, the severe energy impacts
of various emergencies have been the central theme and common denominator of most of our
recent national disasters.
Many actions have been begun over the past several years to develop a national energy
emergency preparedness program-the most notable are outreach programs to reinstill a spirit
of government-industry cooperation during energy emergencies; vertical integration of energy
emergency planning with the states; and training exercises in energy preparedness within the
FEMA emergency management framework.
To have available energy preparedness program, much more needs to be done if we are to
be ready for the potential problems of the 1990s. We need to move into the next decade with the
requisite tools and resources to deal with clearly emerging potential energy problems. The
adequacy of our present emergency response structure sho1:1ld be periodically reviewed. For
example, the Federal government's Department of Energy spends less than one-half of one
percent of its total annual budget on the Office of Energy Emergencies. Yet, it is not so much
a question of allocating large amounts of additional government money and personnel as it is a
requirement for management, organization, and leadership. The energy emergency prepared
ness challenges of the 1990s will test our ability to provide that management, organization, and
leadership.

14

